In a two-period economy with incomplete markets and possibility of default we consider the two classical ways to enforce the honor of financial commitments: by using utility penalties and by using collateral requirements that borrowers have to fulfill. Firstly, we prove that any equilibrium in an economy with collateral requirements is also equilibrium in a non-collateralized economy where each agent is penalized (rewarded) in his utility if his delivery rate is lower (greater) than the payment rate of the financial market. Secondly, we prove the converse: any equilibrium in an economy with utility penalties is also equilibrium in a collateralized economy. For this to be true the payoff function and initial endowments of the agents must be modified in a quite natural way. Finally, we prove that the equilibrium in the economy with collateral requirements attains the same welfare as in the new economy with utility penalties.
Introduction
One of the concerns of the modern general equilibrium theory with incomplete markets (GEI) is the possibility of agents who do not honor their financial commitments.
Since non-negligible default is observed in the real world, it is necessary to use a realistic model to capture the possibility of its occurrence. This is done in order to analyze the implications of default and evaluate policies which avoid financial crashes or loss of efficiency.
In Dubey, Geanakoplos and Shubik (2004) agents are allowed to default on financial debts but each unit of financial debt that is not paid is penalized directly in the utility function. Thus each agent has a payoff function which depends on the private consumption and the amount of non-paid financial debt. On the other hand, Geanakoplos and Zame (2002) model the possibility of default by allowing the borrowers to deliver a previously constituted collateral if its value is lower than the value of the financial debt.
In both cases the default is strategic and chosen by the agent.
The utility penalty parameters used in the former approach are usually related to the loss of credibility of the defaulter in future periods, which restricts his access to the credit market in those periods. The parameters are also interpreted as a sort of non-economic punishment that the agent suffers when the debt is not completely paid. From the theoretical point of view, the possibility of default using utility penalties improves the efficiency of the equilibrium allocations as proved by Zame (1993) . The main advantage of using utility penalties is its analytic treatment in applied models (see for example Goodhart, Sunirand and Tsomocos (2003a, b) ).
The use of collateral requirements provides in some cases a more realistic alternative to model the possibility of default. If the borrower desires a loan he has to constitute a collateral bundle (that can be used by him or by the lender) which may be confiscated if the debt is not paid. In addition to being a more realistic device than utility penalties, their inclusion in models of infinite horizon, as shown by Araujo, Páscoa and Torres-Martinez (2002) and Orrillo (2002) , avoids Ponzi schemes. To see other benefits of collateral in economies with infinite horizons and defaults, we refer to Kubler and Scemeders (2002) . However, it is interesting to note that some kinds of loans are not backed by collateral (for example, loans related to sovereign debt or credit cards).
Besides the benefits of the collateral mentioned above, there are economic and analytic complications to the policy maker if he decides to use this collateral framework in applied models.
The question is: given an equilibrium (prices, allocations of consumption and portfolio and decision of default), is one of these alternatives better than the other to support/explain it? In this paper we show that both approaches are equivalent (in the sense described below) to explain any equilibrium. Specifically, suppose that we have an equilibrium in an economy with collateral requirements. We can then find a system of penalty rates such that the economy with these utility penalties supports the same prices and allocations as equilibrium. In this new economy agents must be punished (rewarded) if they deliver less (more) than the average delivery of the financial market. Reciprocally, any equilibrium in an economy with utility penalties is also an equilibrium in a collateralized economy. For this to be true we need to modify the payoff function and initial endowments of each agent in an appropriate way.
The implications of the results above are clear. If the number of commodities in a collateralized economy is greater than the number of states, then we can replace the enforcement mechanism by one which uses utility penalties. This may be an important simplification for applied economists, since the calibration of utility penalty parameters is easier than the processing of data to determine the collateral structure. On the other hand, moving from a utility penalty system to a collateral one allows us to evaluate the impacts of structural changes on the mechanisms which enforce the honoring of financial commitments. This is analyzed in detail in Subsection 3.2.
Once stated the equivalence above, we discuss its welfare implications. If one passes from the economy with collateral requirements to the economy with utility penalties, the equilibrium allocation maintains the same utility profile of the agents. This means that it does not matter which mechanism enforces the honor of commitments -the agents end up with the same utility in equilibrium. However, when we pass from the economy with utility penalties to the economy with collateral requirements the social welfare is not comparable, in general. Although we cannot maintain the utility of the agents in equilibrium, as in the first case, we prove that the cost/benefit of passing from a penalty system to a collateralized one is equal to the variation of the individual payoff.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 describes the simple two-period setting for the GEI and the two forms to enforce the financial commitments, namely utility penalties and collateral requirements. Section 3 presents the main results, which establish the equivalence between the two mechanisms. We also analyze the welfare implications of this equivalence. Section 4 is devoted to some concluding remarks, and all the proofs are given in the appendix.
The Basic GEI Model with Possibility of Default
We begin by describing the two classical models which represent situations where agents may non-honor their financial commitments. The economy extends over two periods and uncertainty exists only in the second period. There exist L physical goods in each period which are traded in spot markets. In the sequel we will use the same letter to denote either the set or its cardinality. The uncertainty in the second period is described by the set of states } ,..., 1 { S S = . There exist J financial assets, each one offering a contingent real return given by
Markets are incomplete (S > J) and since goods can be durable, the depreciation in state s is described by the matrix
There exist H agents, each one characterized by his consumption set
and initial endowments h h X w ∈ .
A consumption plan for agent h is denoted by and since we are allowing the possibility of default on that debt, it is necessary to define mechanisms to enforce the repayment of (at least part of) that debt.
The Economy with Exogenous Collateral
In this setting each asset J j ∈ is backed by a collateral bundle
in the following sense: If an individual wants to sell j ϕ units of asset j then he must buy j j C ϕ units of goods (that can be used by himself) that will be confiscated if the financial debt j j s s A p ϕ is not paid. Thus, it is publicly known that each unit of asset j will deliver in state s:
Therefore the economy with incomplete markets, possibility of financial default and collateral requirements is defined by:
The definition above assumes that the preferences of individuals are defined on private commodity consumption. However, more general settings can be considered which allow preferences to also be defined on the portfolio plans of the individual. In these cases we can consider a payoff function
for agent h. In the
An equilibrium for C ε is a vector of prices
for each H h ∈ such that:
that satisfy:
The Economy with Utility Penalties
The other form to enforce the repayment of the debt is assuming the existence of a penalty directly applied to the utility of consumption. In this way, if agent h decides to deliver a part of his debt given by
, then his total payoff is given by
. As in the model described in section 2.1, the payoff function may assume more general forms than the quasi-linear form considered here.
Since the penalty is on the non-paid debt, large amounts of short sales may occur, therefore a bounded short sale
of financial assets must be considered. Therefore the economy with incomplete markets, possibility of financial default and utility penalties is defined by:
Since borrowers may default, lenders are aware that they will not receive the total return of their investments. Therefore they publicly assume that the rate of repayment of
, which means that if a lender buys j θ units of asset j then the return of this investment is given by
An equilibrium for the economy P ε is a vector of prices
and for each h a consumption-investment-delivery plan
that satisfies: 
The payment rate is correctly anticipated (rational expectations hypothesis):
Results

From Collateral to Utility Penalties
In this section we will present the main results of the paper. The first one states that any equilibrium in an economy with collateral requirements can be found in an economy with utility penalties with the same initial endowments, if the payoff functions of individuals are modified conveniently.
be an equilibrium of the economy with
. If we define the repayment rate 
is an equilibrium for the economy with utility
for some bounded short sales v.
It is important to note the following:
1.-In the economy C ε agents must purchase durable goods which serve as collateral for each asset sold. Since in the economy P ε it is not necessary, the total consumption in the first period must remain as
2.-Initial endowments, asset returns structure and depreciation rates remain the same. This is an important fact for applied economists because they can choose the simplest model from the same initial data.
3.-Prices and allocations are the same in equilibrium for both economies. 
This is the same Dubey, Geanakoplos and Shubik (2004) ) plus a term which is proportional to the market default rate. This last term encourages the delivery of the debt.
It is worth noting that Theorem 3.1 proposes the translation of a collateralized equilibrium to equilibrium in an economy with utility penalties. The former is a physical enforcement mechanism whereas the other is a subjective (and probably non-observed) enforcement mechanism. In spite of that translation which modifies the payoff function of individuals, they end up with the same private welfare. This is stated in the following corollary.
Corollary 3.2. With the notation of Theorem 3.1 we can conclude that:
This means that for the economies C ε and P ε of Theorem 3.1 the type of enforcement mechanism (collateral requirements or utility penalties) does not matter, from the social point of view. The individuals will end up with the same welfare.
From Utility Penalties to Collateral
In Theorem 3.1 we can see that the market default rate is the same in the two economies. Furthermore the delivery per unit of each asset sold ( 
(the set of all assets with honored promises in state s).
With these notations we have the following theorem.
, the vector of prices and allocations
is an equilibrium of the economy with collateral requirements
and bounded short sales v, where: Finally, the second term in the new payoff function can be written as:
Here the first term corresponds to the net financial return in an economy with utility penalties. Since this return is dropped out from the budget constraint, we have to compensate that effect in the utility of consumption. The second term represents the value of the default given by h. It must be subtracted from the utility of consumption because that term corresponds to an implicit gain that agent h had in the former budget constraint.
We can summarize the composition of the new payoff function in the following diagram. It is also worth noting that in the equilibrium agent h attains the following payoff:
We can interpret this payoff from remarks i) to iv). In terms of utility, i) and iii)
imply that the payoff of agent h is increased in
Furthermore, the transfer given in ii) increases the payoff function in ) , ( . With all these modifications, the new payoff of agent h becomes ) , , (
When we pass from P ε to C ε an analogous result to Corollary 3.2 cannot be obtained. Since it is not true that a borrower (lender) delivers (receives) the same amount in the new economy, he can improve or not his individual welfare. Additionally, the new payoff includes the net personal utility of the collateral borrowed from the CP.
Nevertheless, the net value (in h-utility units) of passing from an economy with utility penalties to a collateralized economy is given by:
. It means that the cost/benefit of implementing a collateral system in an economy with utility penalties is equal to the individual's h payoff change.
For the sake of completeness, we state a theorem which is similar to Theorem 3.3 but includes the case where agents may deliver nothing in the equilibrium of P ε . Again,
be an equilibrium of the economy with utility penalties
and for each , H h ∈ , J j∈ S s∈ and n (an integer greater than one) let us define the function hj sn φ function may be interpreted as a default strategy of the individual h. The net marginal utility for defaulting by using the strategy hj sn φ is given by:
We can observe that n N is zero outside of the set
. With this notation we can state our last theorem.
, the prices and allocations
and bounded short sales v, where: 
, which decreases as . +∞ → n All the analysis done after Theorem 3.3, with respect to the implementation of a collateral system in P ε and its individual cost/benefit, is also valid for Theorem 3.4.
Concluding Remarks
In the literature of general equilibrium theory with incomplete markets and possibility of default, the issue concerning the choice of the mechanism to enforce financial commitments is always discussed. From the theoretical point of view the use of collateral requirements seems more reasonable. However, the use of utility penalties which represent either exclusion from the credit markets in future periods or non-economic punishments has been well received, especially by applied economists.
In this paper we show how these two structures can be compatibilized in order to explain a specific equilibrium. More precisely, if we consider an equilibrium in a collateralized economy for loans, it is possible to redefine the payoff function of the agents to obtain the same equilibrium in this new non-collateralized economy. The payoff functions are modified in such a way that they embody some sort of punishment if the agent does not honor at least part of his debt. Conversely, if we have an equilibrium in an economy with utility penalties and we want to implement a system of collateral requirements, it is possible to redefine the payoff functions and initial endowments of the agents to obtain the same equilibrium in the new economy. Lending the collateral and exchanging the financial earnings of the old system for the corresponding in the new system we obtain the modified initial wealth. Also, all these modifications imply the corresponding modification (in utility units) of the payoff function. This is a very natural way to implement a collateral system in a economy where the default is penalized directly in the utility function. The hypotheses used for these results are the concavity of the utility function and the positiveness of the initial endowments.
Finally, we offer a discussion on the social welfare of these findings. If we pass from an economy with collateral requirements to one with utility penalties, the individual's welfare is maintained. This is a very interesting result because it affirms that both mechanisms used to enforce financial commitments are socially equivalent. In equilibrium the agents achieve the same individual welfare. On the other hand, if we pass from an economy with utility penalties to one with collateral requirements the individual payoff may vary. However, the cost/benefit (in utility units) of implementing the new system equals the variation in the payoff for each individual.
APPENDIX
In most of the proofs we will use the following version of the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker theorem (see Avriel (1976) ). Consider the following maximization problem:
where C is a convex set and
. 
Then we can define
and write down the inequality above as:
In the economy C ε , the complementary conditions for the agent h maximization problem are: and substitute it in the inequality above, the result will be: 
